The Right-to-Honest-Services Doctrine—Enron’s Final Victim: Pure Void-for-Vagueness in Skilling v. United States by Burrell, Wesley
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
3-1-2011
The Right-to-Honest-Services Doctrine—Enron’s
Final Victim: Pure Void-for-Vagueness in Skilling v.
United States
Wesley Burrell
Loyola Law School, Los Angeles
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and
Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wesley Burrell, The Right-to-Honest-Services Doctrine—Enron’s Final Victim: Pure Void-for-Vagueness in Skilling v. United States, 44 Loy.






DOCTRINE—ENRON’S FINAL VICTIM:  
PURE VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS IN  
SKILLING V. UNITED STATES 
Wesley Burrell* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the October 2009 term, the U.S. Supreme Court heard 
argument on the appeal of former Enron CEO Jeff Skilling, in 
Skilling v. United States.1 Skilling had appealed on two grounds. 
First, he challenged the fairness of his trial in Houston, claiming the 
jury was unconstitutionally prejudiced.2 Second, he challenged the 
viability of his conviction for “honest services” wire fraud under 18 
U.S.C. § 13463 (“§ 1346”), contending the statute was 
unconstitutionally vague.4 As to the first ground, the Court ruled in 
line with its precedent, deferring to the trial court and finding 
Skilling’s jury constitutional, and thus foreclosing his hope for a new 
trial.5 Yet, on the second challenge, the Court’s ruling was both more 
favorable to Skilling and more notable in light of the Court’s 
jurisprudence. Breaking new ground on the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine, the Court held § 1346 to be so vague as to require a limiting 
construction lest it be struck down, despite the fact that it implicates 
no secondary civil right or personal liberty.6 On pure vagueness 
grounds, the Court circumscribed the conduct criminalized by § 1346 
to include only conduct involving bribes and kickbacks, thus 
 
 * J.D. 2011, Loyola Law School Los Angeles. Very special thanks to Professor Samuel H. 
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 1. 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010). 
 2. Id. at 2917. 
 3. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006). 
 4. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2925. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 2931. 
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rendering § 1346 inapplicable to Skilling himself.7 Due to Skilling’s 
other convictions, this ruling may have little effect on him. However, 
the Court’s holding regarding § 1346 and its determination based on 
vagueness are pivotal with respect to the Court’s void-for-vagueness 
jurisprudence, and they will certainly be influential on future white 
collar criminal prosecution. 
II.  BACKGROUND AND FACTS OF THE CASE 
In 2001, the Enron Corporation, the seventh highest-revenue-
grossing company in America, and a company whose stock Fortune 
magazine named as one of the top-ten stocks likely to last the 
decade,8 crashed into bankruptcy.9 Nationwide media coverage of the 
crash followed. A federal investigation of what had gone wrong 
commenced, and its results revealed an unprecedented web of 
complex corporate fraud, at the center of which sat former CEOs 
Ken Lay and Jeff Skilling. 
Enron formed in 1985.10 It started as a gas-pipeline company, 
selling and transporting natural gas in regulated energy markets.11 In 
1988, however, then-CEO Lay shifted the company’s strategy.12 As 
states began to deregulate energy markets, Lay determined that 
Enron should transform itself into a “free-agent merchant”—an 
energy broker for the new unregulated energy marketplace.13 Skilling 
joined the company in 1990 to facilitate this transformation.14 As 
chief executive for Enron’s finance unit, Skilling spearheaded 
Enron’s transition from an energy dealer to a commodities trading 
 
 7. Id. 
 8. Jeffrey D. Van Niel, Enron—The Primer, in ENRON AND OTHER CORPORATE FIASCOS: 
THE CORPORATE SCANDAL READER 61, 69 (Nancy B. Rapoport et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009) (“Enron 
was named the ‘most innovative’ company in the United States by Fortune magazine every year 
between 1996 and 2001. In mid-August 2000, Fortune magazine named Enron as one of the top 
ten stocks that would last the decade because Enron had so successfully transformed itself from a 
stodgy gas utility into the largest online broker of energy.” (footnote omitted)). 
 9. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2907; see also LOREN FOX, ENRON: THE RISE AND FALL, at xii 
(2003) (“With $62 billion in assets, this [was] the biggest such filing in U.S. history up to that 
time.”). 
 10. FOX, supra note 9, at vii. 
 11. See id. 
 12. Id. at 20. 
 13. Id. at 22. See generally id. at 22–25 (describing the suitability of Enron’s business model 
for optimal success in unregulated markets). 
 14. Id. at 33. 
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and financial services company.15 Guided by Skilling, Enron adapted 
strategies from the financial industry, such as options, swaps, and 
other investment tools, to create a dynamic energy market.16 Skilling 
favored an “asset-light” strategy of business.17 He aimed to turn 
Enron into a financial company with value based more on intellectual 
capital and deal engineering than on physical assets.18 
Unknown to analysts or Enron’s investors, however, part of 
Skilling’s business strategy included various earning and cash-flow 
“levers.”19 These enabled Enron to artificially inflate its earnings 
statements and hide large losses to meet its own growth targets and 
outside analysts’ expectations.20 Enron could hide debt and losses 
through deals with purported third-party entities that were not 
actually independent of Enron.21 It also fabricated earnings and 
overvalued its assets through a form of accounting called “mark-to-
market.”22 Additionally, it hid failing investments by “parking” them 
with investment partners to keep them off quarterly and year-end 
balance sheets.23 Together, these levers enabled Enron to prop up its 
stock, conceal its debt, and create the appearance of corporate health 
and stability.24 
By 2000, Skilling’s tactics, coupled with his and Lay’s 
leadership, had made Enron the United States’ leading energy 
company, with claimed revenues totaling $100.8 billion in 2000, up 
750 percent from 1996—unprecedented growth in the energy-and-
utility industry.25 In January 2001, even after Enron’s stock had split, 
it hit $80 per share.26 The following month, Skilling was named 
 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 35–37. 
 17. Id. at 34. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See Superseding Indictment at 8, United States v. Causey, No. H-04-25 (S-2) (S.D. Tex. 
July 7, 2004) [hereinafter Indictment]. 
 20. See id. 
 21. Id. at 12–15. 
 22. FOX, supra note 9, at 40–42. 
 23. Indictment, supra note 19, at 16 (noting that Enron “parked” assets by engineering faux 
sales of bad assets solely to achieve year-end budget targets). 
 24. Id. at 7–8. 
 25. Bala G. Dharan & William R. Bufkins, Red Flags in Enron’s Reporting of Revenues and 
Key Financial Measures, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 97, 99–100 
(Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004). 
 26. Indictment, supra note 19, at 8. 
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CEO, with Lay staying on as chairman of the board.27 However, 
Skilling served only six months before resigning and leaving Enron 
that August, citing personal reasons.28 By that November, just three 
months after Skilling had departed, Enron unraveled.29 The major 
credit rating agencies had downgraded Enron’s bonds to “junk” 
status, and its stock was trading at sixty-one cents per share.30 In 
December 2001, Enron declared bankruptcy.31 
The media met Enron’s collapse with virulent outrage and 
volumes of negative press.32 A congressional committee performed 
an inquiry, the SEC initiated a formal investigation, and the Justice 
Department created the Enron Task Force to investigate and 
prosecute criminal activity related to Enron’s downfall.33 In 2004, as 
a result of the Enron Task Force’s investigation and after numerous 
Enron executives had pled guilty, a grand jury indicted Skilling and 
Lay.34 Skilling was indicted for conspiracy to commit wire fraud and 
conspiracy to commit securities fraud, as well as wire fraud and 
securities fraud.35 Skilling’s fraud charges arose from his complicity 
in using levers to manipulate Enron’s earnings statements, as well as 
the false and misleading disclosures that he authorized on balance 
sheets, and financial statements, and those he made personally in his 
statements to analysts and ratings agents.36 Additionally, he was 
charged with two counts of making false statements to auditors and 
ten counts of insider trading.37 
Skilling and Lay were to be tried together in Houston.38 But due 
to the overwhelming negative sentiment in Houston—the former 
location of Enron’s headquarters and, perhaps, the city hardest hit by 
 
 27. FOX, supra note 9, at x. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at xi–xii. 
 30. Id. at xii. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2954 (2010). 
 33. See The Rise and Fall of Enron, PBS ONLINE NEWS HOUR (Jan. 2002), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/infrastructure/power/enron_time.html. 
 34. Kristen Hays, Enron at Eye Level: A Reporter’s View of the Trials, in ENRON AND 
OTHER CORPORATE FIASCOS: THE CORPORATE SCANDAL READER, supra note 8, at 3, 11–15. 
 35. Indictment, supra note 19, at 36–42, 46–49. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 49–53, 58–60. 
 38. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2907–08 (2010). 
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the firm’s collapse—Skilling and Lay moved for a change of venue 
in their jury trial.39 The court denied the motion.40 At trial, a jury 
found Skilling guilty on all counts except the nine counts of insider 
trading that were alleged to have occurred prior to his time as CEO 
and Enron’s implosion.41 The jury also found Lay guilty but he died 
before sentencing, and the trial judge vacated his conviction.42 
Skilling appealed his conviction on two grounds. First, he 
argued that the pretrial publicity in Houston was so prejudicial and 
pervasive as to raise a presumption of juror prejudice,43 rendering his 
trial unconstitutional. Second, he argued that his convictions for 
conspiracy to commit wire fraud and for wire fraud itself, under the 
“intangible right to honest services” statute, § 1346, could not 
stand.44 He argued that the statute was either unconstitutionally vague 
or, at least, could not be interpreted to include his actions. 
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found 
Skilling’s jury trial to have been constitutional45 and rejected 
Skilling’s second argument regarding the honest-services statute’s 
vagueness.46 It thereby upheld his convictions. Skilling sought 
certiorari and the Supreme Court granted it.47 The Court ruled that 
Skilling had received a fair trial.48 However, it vacated the Fifth 
Circuit’s opinion with respect to § 1346. 
III.  SKILLING’S CONVICTION  
FOR WIRE FRAUD 
After it disposed of Skilling’s first contention of juror prejudice, 
the Court addressed his convictions for wire fraud and the contention 
that these could not stand because the right-to-honest-services statute 
on which they were based was unconstitutionally vague.49 Skilling 
had been convicted of wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire 
 
 39. Id. at 2908. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 2911. 
 42. David Ivanovich, The Sentencing of Jeff Skilling, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 24, 2006, at A8. 
 43. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2911. 
 44. Id. at 2911, 2925–26. 
 45. Id. at 2911–12. 
 46. Id. at 2912. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 2925. 
 49. Id. at 2925–34. 
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fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343.50 To commit wire fraud, one must 
have “devise[d] a[] scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining 
money or property by means of false . . . pretenses, representations, 
or promises . . . .”51 Typically, fraud requires that “the victim’s loss 
of money or property suppl[y] the defendant’s gain.”52 However, the 
honest-services theory of fraud, codified in § 1346, only requires that 
the defendant’s fraud deprive the victims of their “intangible right of 
honest services.”53 This right results from a fiduciary duty that the 
defendant owes to the victims.54 Meanwhile, the defendant’s gain 
comes about through some third party, wittingly or unwittingly.55 
The prosecutors theorized that the victims of Skilling’s fraud 
were Enron’s shareholders and investors.56 Because he had not 
fraudulently obtained money or property directly from the investors 
and shareholders, Skilling could not have been guilty of money-or-
property wire fraud. He had, however, fraudulently violated his duty 
to honestly represent the company’s condition to its shareholders and 
investors.57 And in so doing, he had gained for himself $14 million in 
salary and $89 million in profits from stock options.58 Under the 
prosecution’s theory, Skilling was guilty of wire fraud because he 
had deprived his victims of their right to his honest services to make 
money for himself. Skilling contended that he could not be guilty, 
however, because § 1346 lacked clarity such that it was 
unconstitutionally vague and therefore must be voided. In the 
alternative, he argued that the statute did not apply to his conduct.59 
The Court agreed with Skilling that § 1346 could not encompass his 
 
 50. Id. at 2907. 
 51. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2006). 
 52. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2926. 
 53. 18 U.S.C. § 1346. 
 54. See Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2930–31. 
 55. See id. at 2926. 
 56. Brief for the United States at 50, Skilling, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (No. 08-1394), 2010 WL 
302206 at *50 (“[Skilling] placed his interests in conflict with that of the shareholders, when, for 
his own financial benefit, he engaged in an undisclosed scheme to artificially inflate the stock’s 
price by deceiving the shareholders and others about the company’s true financial condition.”). 
 57. See id. 
 58. Indictment, supra note 19, at 6. 
 59. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2926. 
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conduct, but it stopped short of voiding60 the statute as a whole, 
choosing instead to apply a limiting construction.61 
A.  The Majority’s Opinion on the Right-to- 
Honest-Services Fraud and Vagueness 
The majority first reviewed the origins and application of the 
right-to-honest-services doctrine.62 The Court noted that the doctrine 
initially derived from the disjunctive wording of the wire fraud 
statute: from the “scheme . . . to defraud, or for obtaining money or 
property.”63 Circuit courts had reasoned that the disjunctive phrasing 
conveyed Congress’s intent to outlaw both schemes to defraud 
victims of money or property and schemes to defraud victims that 
did not involve directly dispossessing them of money or property.64 
Over time, this developed into the doctrine of honest-services fraud. 
In Skilling, the majority found the core of this doctrine to have been 
consistent across circuits despite there being some variation as to its 
exact contours and application.65 This doctrine was not based on a 
clear statement from Congress, however, and so in 1987, in McNally 
v. United States,66 the Supreme Court struck it down.67 There, the 
Court applied the rule of lenity in interpreting the wire fraud statute 
and eliminated the honest-services doctrine, stating that Congress 
would have to be clearer about its intent before the doctrine could be 
applied.68 Congress responded a year later by passing § 1346, 
explicitly reinstating the honest-services doctrine by name but 
providing no further clarification as to its definition, application, or 
contours.69 Thus, the majority in Skilling reasoned that Congress’s 
 
 60. Id. at 2929. 
 61. Id. at 2934. 
 62. Id. at 2926. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See id. at 2931. 
 66. 483 U.S. 350 (1987). 
 67. Id. at 361. McNally actually concerned mail fraud. Id. at 352. However, the phrasing of 
mail and wire fraud is identical as to the operative disjunctive underlying honest-services fraud 
and so the ruling also applied to wire fraud. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006) (criminalizing any 
“scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property”), with id. § 1343 
(criminalizing activity defined identically when the fraud is transmitted by wire, radio, or 
television). 
 68. See McNally, 483 U.S. at 360. 
 69. See Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2927. 
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intent in defining honest-services fraud under § 1346 was to “refer to 
and incorporate the honest-services doctrine recognized in Court of 
Appeals’ decisions before McNally.”70 
Having established pre-McNally case law as the key for defining 
§ 1346, the Court assessed whether the doctrine, so defined, was 
unconstitutionally vague. It determined that the doctrine had 
sufficient definiteness to (1) provide notice and (2) protect against 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, if its application were 
limited to the core conduct that all courts had typically applied it 
to—that is to “bribery and kickback schemes.”71 The Court refused to 
void the statute as unconstitutionally vague and, instead, applied a 
limiting construction so as to restrict the doctrine’s application only 
to “offenders who, in violation of a fiduciary duty, participated in 
bribery or kickback schemes.”72 It justified this ruling by citing its 
obligation to “construe [and] not condemn, Congress’ enactments,”73 
noting that it has been the Court’s practice, when possible, to apply a 
limiting construction to a problematic statute before striking it as 
unconstitutional.74 Outside the bounds of the limiting construction, 
the majority conceded that courts were in “considerable disarray over 
the statute’s application.”75 To add further clarity to the conduct that 
the limiting construction encompassed, the majority explained that 
the honest-services doctrine “draws content” from other federal 
bribery and kickback statutes, including 18 U.S.C. § 201(b), 18 
U.S.C. § 666(a)(2), and 41 U.S.C. § 52(2).76 
Because the government had already conceded that Skilling did 
not engage in bribery and that his conduct did not constitute a 
kickback scheme, the Court vacated his conviction for honest-
services fraud.77 However, the Court remanded his conviction for 
conspiracy because the prosecution had charged two alternative 
objects of the conspiracy: securities fraud and money-or-property 
 
 70. Id. at 2928. 
 71. Id. at 2933. 
 72. Id. at 2930. 
 73. Id. at 2928. 
 74. Id. at 2929 (“‘The elementary rule is that every reasonable construction must be resorted 
to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.’” (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 
648, 657 (1895))). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 2933. 
 77. Id. at 2934. 
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wire fraud.78 His conviction for conspiracy will stand if the inclusion 
of honest-services wire fraud, now ruled to be inapplicable, with 
these alternative objects of conspiracy was a harmless error.79 
B.  Scalia’s Concurrence on the Right to  
Honest-Services Fraud and Vagueness 
Scalia concurred in the judgment but objected to the majority’s 
application of a limiting construction to save § 1346.80 Citing United 
States v. Reese,81 he argued that a “statute that is unconstitutionally 
vague cannot be saved by . . . judicial construction that writes in 
specific criteria that its text does not contain.”82 Unlike the majority 
opinion, the concurrence did not find a consistent core to the pre-
McNally case law.83 Indeed, the concurrence noted that no court had 
ever previously limited the statute to what the majority called the 
doctrine’s core conduct.84 Additionally, Scalia pointed out that there 
has never been agreement as to the nature of the fiduciary duty to 
which the right to honest services applies, where it derives from, or 
what constitutes a breach.85 The concurrence thus argued that the 
Court should have found the statute void for vagueness.86 
IV.  ANALYSIS OF THE COURT’S RULING  
ON THE INTANGIBLE RIGHT TO HONEST SERVICES 
A.  The Court’s New Application of Vagueness 
Though the Court vacated Skilling’s conviction for honest-
services fraud, many commentators maintain that his other 
convictions will likely stand.87 The prosecution’s theory was that 
 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See id. at 2935 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 81. 92 U.S. 214 (1876). 
 82. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2935 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Reese, 92 U.S. at 219–21). 
 83. See id. at 2936. 
 84. Id. at 2939. 
 85. Id. at 2936–37. 
 86. Id. at 2935. 
 87. See, e.g., Mark J. Stein & Joshua A. Levine, Skilling: Is It Really a Game-Changer for 
Mail and Wire Fraud Cases?, in SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE 2010, 
at 938 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 23726, 2010) (“For Jeffrey 
Skilling, the Supreme Court’s decision may make little difference. . . . [his] numerous other 
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Skilling had induced investors to make purchase decisions based on 
false information. This conduct fits squarely within the statutory 
definition of securities fraud.88 Also, the Court’s decision may not 
heavily alter future prosecutions for corruption under § 1346. 
Though the doctrine was well known for its versatility and favored 
by prosecutors for these characteristics,89 the statute remains intact 
with regard to the core conduct of bribery and kickback schemes, and 
prosecutors have typically brought § 1346 cases for conduct that 
would qualify as bribery or kickbacks.90 Also, although § 1346 is 
now limited, other versatile and malleable white-collar criminal 
statutes allow the government to prosecute much of the outlying 
conduct that § 1346 no longer criminalizes.91 
The most exceptional aspect of the Skilling opinion, however, is 
not its direct effect on honest-services fraud prosecutions. Skilling 
marks a shift in the Supreme Court’s use of the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine in criminal cases. Previously, this due process doctrine had 
functioned foremost as a means to protect other liberties such as civil 
rights, First Amendment liberties, or equal protection concerns.92 In 
his 1990 article projecting the likely inapplicability of the doctrine to 
another white-collar statute—the Racketeering Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) Act—Joseph Bauerschmidt noted 
that in a survey of more than seventy cases citing the void-for-
vagueness doctrine between 1960 and 1990, courts consistently 
applied the doctrine as a means of protecting a secondary right rather 
 
convictions are likely to still stand.”); id. at 935 (“Jeffrey Skilling probably will not escape jail-
time given that he was also convicted of multiple other offenses . . . .”). 
 88. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2001); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78ff (2006). 
 89. Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771, 771 
(1980) (“To federal prosecutors of white collar crime, the mail fraud statute is our Stradivarius, 
our Colt 45, our Louisville Slugger, our Cuisinart—and our true love.”). 
 90. Stein & Levine, supra note 87, at 938–39 (“[A] review of the more than 600 published 
decisions involving the honest-services statute reveals that the overwhelming majority of such 
cases involved either allegations of a bribe or kickback, or conduct that was, or could have been, 
charged as a traditional wire/mail fraud or under other federal statutes, such as those prohibiting 
securities fraud, extortion, and bribery.”). 
 91. See, e.g., Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2006); Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2006). 
 92. Joseph E. Bauerschmidt, “Mother of Mercy—Is This the End of Rico?”—Justice Scalia 
Invites Constitutional Void-for-Vagueness Challenge to RICO “Pattern,” 65 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1106, 1116 (1990). 
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than for pure due process purposes.93 Indeed, with the exception of 
Skilling,94 in every case since 1990 in which the Court has considered 
the doctrine’s applicability to a criminal statute, the statute in 
question has also implicated a secondary injustice from the violation 
of a civil right or personal liberty.95 In contrast, in Skilling, the Court 
held § 1346 to be so vague as to require a limiting construction 
despite the fact that the statute does no injustice to a secondary 
liberty. Instead, the Court circumscribed § 1346 purely to protect the 
defendant’s due process rights. 
The injustice at issue in Skilling is of a different variety than the 
injustices at issue in previous void-for-vagueness decisions. In 
Chicago v. Morales,96 for example, the Court applied the void-for-
vagueness doctrine to remedy the injustice of a city anti-loitering 
ordinance because the statute impinged on citizens’ right to move 
about or loiter.97 In voiding the statute, the Court referred to the 
historical use of such loitering statutes as a means to discriminate 
against racial minorities and the poor.98 Accordingly, the Court 
applied the doctrine to remedy an injustice implicating civil rights 
and economic discrimination. In contrast, the Skilling opinion cited 
no additional liberty concern. The injustice in Skilling was simply 
that “[w]ithout some coherent limiting principle . . . [§ 1346] invites 
abuse by headline-grabbing prosecutors in pursuit of local officials, 
state legislators, and corporate CEOs who engage in any manner of 
 
 93. Id. at 1118–20 (concluding based on Supreme Court precedent to that point, since RICO 
did not implicate a secondary personal liberty or civil rights it was probably not susceptible to a 
vagueness challenge). 
 94. One additional void-for-vagueness case does not implicate a secondary right. Posters ‘N’ 
Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513 (1994). However, in Posters ‘N’ Things, the Court did 
not hold the statute to be vague in any way. 
 95. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007) (considering whether a statute is void for 
vagueness because it “imposes an undue burden on a woman’s right to abortion”); Hill v. 
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (deciding whether a statute that allegedly violated the defendant’s 
First Amendment rights was unconstitutionally vague); Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) 
(applying the vagueness doctrine to a statute impinging the personal liberty to loiter); Tuilaepa v. 
California, 512 U.S. 967 (1994) (considering whether a California statute is unconstitutionally 
vague with respect to defendant’s Constitutional right against cruel and unusual punishment); 
Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) (considering a void-for-vagueness challenge 
where a statute prohibiting lawyers from making extrajudicial statements to the press violated 
lawyers’ First Amendment rights). 
 96. 527 U.S. 41. 
 97. Id. at 53, 55–56. 
 98. Id. at 53 n.20. 
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unappealing or ethically questionable conduct”;99 the injustice 
remedied in Skilling is vagueness itself and the overcriminalization 
that is its result.100 
That this injustice occurred in Skilling is evident from the facts 
of the case. Enron’s fall was a national tragedy, a corporate 
bankruptcy of unparalleled scope.101 It resulted in vehement public 
outcry for the responsible parties to be brought to justice. Hence, 
since Skilling helmed Enron during its rise and as it began its fall, 
prosecutors had heavy incentives to prosecute Skilling for his risky 
and legally questionable conduct. But many of the accounting 
procedures Skilling implemented at Enron, which his indictment 
referenced, were common practices in other U.S. companies.102 
Corporate managers at many other U.S. companies likewise shared 
his managerial focus on hyping projected accounting numbers to 
obscure the underlying economic realities.103 Additionally, many of 
the complex business deals Enron engaged in to manipulate its debt 
disclosures—particularly its use of Enron-controlled, supposedly 
third-party entities (Special Purpose Entities) to conceal losses and 
heavy risk—were used by other corporations.104 Most importantly, 
 
 99. Sorich v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1308, 1310 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial 
of certiorari). 
 100. Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress 
Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 748 (2005) (“Many argue that a good deal of 
so-called regulatory or ‘white collar crime’ should fall outside the ambit of the criminal law, to be 
dealt with by other bodies of specialized civil law, such as corporate governance, environmental, 
or election finance law.”); MARIE GRYPHON, IT’S A CRIME?: FLAWS IN FEDERAL STATUTES 
THAT PUNISH STANDARD BUSINESS PRACTICE 2–3 (Manhattan Inst. Ed., 2009), available at 
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/cjr_12.pdf (noting that injustice results when “prohibited 
behaviors are . . . hard to distinguish from the kinds of productive activities that businesspeople 
[and government officials] are obligated to engage in” and suggesting that “businesspeople often 
try to go up to the line that separates legitimate, if aggressive, business conduct from indictable 
behavior without crossing it”). 
 101. Dan Ackman, Top of the News: Enron Files Chap. 11, FORBES (Dec. 3, 2001), 
http://www.forbes.com/2001/12/03/1203topnews_print.html (citing Enron’s bankruptcy filing 
as—at that time—”the largest bankruptcy filing in U.S. history”). 
 102. Frank Partnoy, Enron and the Derivatives World, in ENRON AND OTHER CORPORATE 
FIASCOS: THE CORPORATE SCANDAL READER, supra note 8, at 105, 110. 
 103. Id. at 111 (“‘[C]orporate management’s performance is generally measured by 
accounting income, not underlying economics. Risk management strategies are therefore directed 
at accounting rather than economic performance.’ This alarming statement is representative of the 
accounting-driven focus of U.S. managers generally, who all too frequently have little interest in 
maintaining controls to monitor their firm’s economic realities.”). 
 104. See Bala G. Dharan, Enron’s Accounting Issues: What Can We Learn to Prevent Future 
Enrons?, in ENRON AND OTHER CORPORATE FIASCOS: THE CORPORATE SCANDAL READER, 
supra note 8, at 85, 89. 
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however, though prosecutors charged that Skilling had 
misrepresented the company’s health, Enron had disclosed the details 
of its financial situation to shareholders and the investing public 
while under Skilling’s leadership.105 Skilling may have continued to 
insist on the healthiness of the company even though he knew that its 
health was quite questionable.106 But he also released financial 
reports and other public statements sufficient to disclose the actual 
state of Enron’s finances.107 Analysts and reporters, through careful 
analysis of those documents alone, ascertained Enron’s true financial 
situation.108 In fact, it was the reporting on those disclosures that 
precipitated Enron’s fall.109 It is therefore plausible that Skilling’s 
conduct was not in fact criminal but merely amounted to aggressive 
business practices coupled with a CEO’s misguidedly optimistic 
projections. Ambiguity regarding the criminality of Skilling’s 
conduct may have led prosecutors to rely on § 1346’s ambiguity to 
get a conviction. 
B.  Skilling and Vagueness in  
White Collar Crime Generally 
Skilling reveals a general problem with criminalization in the 
white-collar arena. Two elements that are necessary to curb the 
injustice of overcriminalization and limit vagueness in criminal 
statutes are (1) scienter and (2) objective criteria that specify the 
harm to be protected against.110 These are difficult to apply in the 
white-collar arena, however, and are therefore often missing from (or 
 
 105. Malcolm Gladwell, Enron, Intelligence, and the Perils of Too Much Information, in 
ENRON AND OTHER CORPORATE FIASCOS: THE CORPORATE SCANDAL READER, supra note 8, at 
269, 275. 
 106. See id. at 275. 
 107. Id. at 276. 
 108. See id. at 275–76. 
 109. See id. at 275; see also Joel M. Androphy, The Enron Finale: Justice or Retribution?, 70 
TEX. B.J. 32, 33 (2007) (“Skilling and Lay contended that the media reporting [may have] caused 
a ‘run on the banks’ and loss of credit and confidence.”). 
 110. See Posters ‘N’ Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 525–26 (1994) (holding that 
scienter and objective criteria are required for assessing whether items qualify as drug 
paraphernalia and that these requirements saved a criminal statute from being void for 
vagueness); Bauerschmidt, supra note 92, at 1124 (“Statutes with independent scienter 
requirements are never vague.”); see also J. Kelly Strader, White Collar Crime and Punishment: 
Reflections on Michael, Martha, and Milberg Weiss, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 45, 55 (2007) 
(arguing that without proof of “substantial, identifiable harm . . . the government should not resort 
to the criminal law”). 
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ambiguous in) white-collar criminal statutes. With respect to 
scienter, it is hard to prove that defendants like Skilling actually 
acted with specific intent to defraud shareholders or to illegally 
obtain money or property.111 Often, it is quite likely they did not act 
with such intent112 but intended simply to shrewdly and legally 
succeed in business or politics. Even when specific intent to defraud 
may exist, it can be difficult to prove. In Skilling, the prosecution 
lacked any smoking-gun” evidence tying Skilling to much of the 
alleged wrongdoing, much less proving scienter.113 
With respect to specifying harm, the harm of white-collar 
offenses is often difficult to ascertain and to prove. Corrupt conduct 
generally causes small individual harms “significant only in the 
aggregate,” making the actual cost of corruption difficult to calculate 
unless there is some major tragedy such as Enron’s collapse.114 
Difficulty in determining the cost, in turn, leads to moral ambiguity 
with respect to the conduct itself.115 The complicated nature of 
harmful conduct in such cases also makes it difficult to prove to the 
jury the specific harm, as was the case in Skilling.116 These 
difficulties in ascertaining and proving harm result in Congress 
drafting statutes with uncertain scienter requirements, criminalizing 
vague and ambiguous harms so as to potentially encompass a broad 
array of conduct.117 Congress thereby lets prosecutors determine what 
conduct to criminalize. Such statutes shift Congress’s legislative 
crime-making power to prosecutors and courts.118 They also facilitate 
criminalizing conduct in hindsight, such as what occurred in Skilling. 
 
 111. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights Doctrine: Someone to 
Watch Over Us, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 153, 195 (1994). 
 112. Id. 
 113. See John C. Hueston, Behind the Scenes of the Enron Trail: Creating the Decisive 
Moments, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 197, 197 n.3 (2007). 
 114. Stuart P. Green, Moral Ambiguity in White Collar Criminal Law, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 501, 509 (2004). 
 115. Id. at 510. 
 116. Hueston, supra note 113 at 200 (noting it was a “challenge . . . translating a complicated 
earnings manipulation scheme to a Houston jury”). 
 117. See Strader, supra note 110, at 96 (“The vagueness of many white collar statutes should 
be news to no one.”). 
 118. See id. (“[A]ll too often prosecutors overreach in instances of ambiguous harm and 
unproven legal theories.”); see also Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional 
Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 763 (1999) (“[T]he breadth of 
federal criminal law owes far less to legislative choices than to creative judicial interpretations, 
spurred on by prosecutors careful to choose the right cases to advance their agendas.”). 
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When Congress does not set minimum guidelines to govern law 
enforcement, there is no limit to the conduct that can be 
criminalized.119 
Some commentators suggest additional motives for Congress’s 
drafting of ambiguous statutes. Such statutes allow legislators to 
avoid blame when laws do not produce desirable results. They enable 
legislators to appear tough on crime without requiring careful 
consideration of the specific conduct the laws criminalize or the 
degree to which the laws encroach on state police powers. 
Additionally, legislators can explain ambiguous legislation 
differently to different audiences. It thus “satisf[ies] a broader range 
of a heterogeneous population.”120 Furthermore, legislators may need 
ambiguity simply as a political practicality to build support for 
legislation. 
Many factors motivate Congress to draft white-collar criminal 
statutes ambiguously. For these reasons, and because of the 
particular characteristics of white-collar crime discussed above, 
Congress has tended to pass ambiguous criminal statutes. Had the 
Court struck down § 1346 entirely, the Department of Justice would 
have likely sought a replacement with similar flexibility,121 and 
Congress would have likely passed one. Perhaps it is partly for this 
reason that the Skilling majority did not rule with Scalia’s 
concurrence and void the statute entirely. Instead it ruled in line with 
Justice O’Connor’s suggestion in Morales,122 applying a limiting 
construction with instructions for defining scienter as an “intent to 
perform an act in exchange for a benefit”123 and specifying objective 
 
 119. See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1026 (2d Cir. 1986) (judging the 
defendant’s conduct to be criminal for violating the terms of an employee handbook), aff’d, 484 
U.S. 19 (1987). 
 120. Gillian K. Hadfield, Weighing the Value of Vagueness: An Economic Perspective on 
Precision in the Law, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 541, 550 (1994). 
 121. Timothy P. O’Toole, The Honest-Services Surplus: Why There’s No Need (or Place) for 
a Federal Law Prohibiting “Criminal-esque” Conduct in the Nature of Bribes and Kickbacks, 63 
VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 49, 59 (2010). 
 122. Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 68 (1999) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]he . . . 
loitering ordinance could have been construed more narrowly. The term ‘loiter’ might . . . be 
construed . . . to mean ‘to remain . . . with no apparent purpose other than to establish control over 
identifiable areas, to intimidate others from entering those areas, or to conceal illegal activities.”). 
 123. United States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134, 146–47 (2007); see Skilling v. United States, 130 
S. Ct. 2896, 2934 (2010) (citing Ganim, 510 F.3d at 147–49, as an example of how § 1346 draws 
content from other federal bribery and kickback statutes). 
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criteria for assessing the harm by limiting § 1346 to its core conduct 
of bribery and kickback schemes. 
C.  The New Applicability of Vagueness and  
Remaining Ambiguity in § 1346 
The Court’s limitation of § 1346 as a pure protection of due 
process may indicate a shift in its approach to criminal statutes 
generally. Most white-collar criminal statutes outlawing corporate or 
political crime do not implicate secondary liberties such as civil 
rights, First Amendment, or equal protection, despite their broad and 
often ambiguous applications. Yet such statutes perpetuate injustices 
in their own right. The Court’s decision in Skilling may change the 
Court’s consideration of such laws and may expand the applicability 
of vagueness challenges in lower courts as well. 
But despite the Court’s limitation of § 1346, the underlying 
statute’s unchanged ambiguity continues to render its applicability 
somewhat uncertain. As Scalia points out, exactly what fiduciary 
duties the right to honest services applies to remains uncertain.124 
Likewise, while the scienter requirement drawn from bribery or 
kickback statutes will give additional contour to § 1346, it is 
uncertain whether § 1346’s underlying scienter requirements, such as 
the “intent to defraud,”125 survive the application of scienter for 
bribery or kickbacks. Is a scheme to defraud simply subsumed into 
the intent to receive a bribe or kickback, or is the scheme to defraud 
a separate element? If it is separate, how do they interact? Similarly, 
it is unclear whether a bribe functions differently under § 1346 than 
it would under 18 U.S.C. § 201 (“§ 201”).126 In United States v. 
Ganim,127 the Second Circuit determined, pre-Skilling, that it does.128 
Section 201 bribery requires that the parties identify the specific act 
to be performed in exchange for the bribe when a party makes the 
 
 124. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2936 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Modern 
Mail Fraud: The Restoration of the Public/Private Distinction, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 427, 455 
(1998) (“Although § 1346 may well constitute a clear statement that public officials are to remain 
subject to federal anticorruption legislation, relatively little is said about the private fiduciary 
context.”). 
 125. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 102 (1945) (plurality opinion) (quoting Hygrade 
Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497, 502–03 (1925)). 
 126. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2006). 
 127. 510 F.3d 134 (2007). 
 128. Id. at 147–48. 
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bribe or gives a promise of property.129 In Ganim, the Court ruled, 
however, that § 1346 did not have this “specific act” requirement.130 
Indeed, for this reason it is possible that prosecutors could turn to 
§ 1346 to get around the “specific act” requirement of § 201.131 Thus, 
some ambiguities remain in § 1346 despite the Court’s limiting 
construction in Skilling. 
D.  Skilling and Federalism 
There is one additional ambiguity that the Court’s opinion does 
not address. A companion case to Skilling, Weyhrauch v. United 
States,132 raised the question of whether behavior not criminalized 
under a state statute could be criminalized under § 1346.133 The Court 
remanded Weyhrauch in light of the ruling in Skilling, without 
answering this question.134 The issue of federalism was almost 
entirely absent from the opinion in Skilling. The Court only 
addressed the issue to note that the remaining utility of § 1346, after 
it has been limited to bribery and kickbacks (conduct that other 
federal statutes criminalize), is its applicability to state, local, and 
private individuals whose conduct would be otherwise unreachable 
by federal prosecutors.135 Notwithstanding the myriad other problems 
that result from federal intervention into state corruption,136 to permit 
§ 1346 to be applicable in the state arena without limiting its 
application to conduct that state law criminalizes seems to implicate 
some of the same due process concerns that form the basis of the 
Court’s decision in Skilling. Indeed, there are “no clear, uniform 
national standards of ethics in local politics or corporate governance” 
 
 129. Id. at 146–47. 
 130. Id. at 147. 
 131. See Randall D. Eliason, Surgery with a Meat Axe: Using Honest Services Fraud to 
Prosecute Federal Corruption, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 929, 970 (2009). 
 132. 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). 
 133. Weyhrauch v. United States, 548 F.3d 1237, 1239 (2008). 
 134. Weyhrauch, 130 S. Ct. 2971. 
 135. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2934 n.45 (“Overlap with other federal 
statutes does not render § 1346 superfluous. . . . [§] 1346’s application to state and local 
corruption and to private-sector fraud reaches misconduct that might otherwise go unpunished.”) 
 136. Federal criminalization of state and local corruption by means of standards that federal 
courts and federal prosecutors determine makes state and local officials more accountable to the 
federal government than those who voted for them. Moohr, supra note 111, at 175; see also id. at 
174 (noting that federal prosecutions of this nature “encourage[ ] citizens to abdicate their 
responsibility for self-government at the state and local levels . . . [which] erodes the notion that 
the federal government lacks general police powers”). 
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to provide notice to defendants or to protect from arbitrary 
enforcement when § 1346 extends into the state arena.137 Policing 
local politics and corporate governance is traditionally the state’s 
domain. Defendants may expect that they are accountable only to the 
state law in these areas. The Court did not address this matter, 
however. Presumably, it is confident that Skilling and § 1346 itself 
provide sufficient notice to potential defendants that corporate 
governance is not the state’s exclusive province when it comes to 
corruption. Nonetheless, such an apparent invasion of state 
sovereignty ought to come by way of a clear statement from 
Congress on its intent to do so, rather than from the judiciary. 
Section 1346 does not seem to satisfy that requirement. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
It is unclear to what extent the remaining ambiguity of § 1346 
will continue to permit unelected prosecutors to determine criminal 
conduct.138 Unambiguous language from Congress would have been 
ideal. Nonetheless, the Court’s decision brings new life to due 
process by limiting § 1346 on purely due process grounds. In so 
doing, it affirmed the right to notice and to be protected against 
arbitrary prosecution. The Court, likewise, pushed back against 
Congress instituting ambiguous criminal statutes and the resulting 
trend toward overcriminalization. Its opinion does much to reinforce 
judicial power, in particular the judiciary’s power to define law when 
Congress will not. 
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